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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the impact of the economic reform programme on the financing choices of 
Zimbabwean listed companies.  Using the published accounts of a sample of companies we show 
that listed firms rely heavily on external finance, especially short term bank financing.  We 
estimate an eclectic econometric model of firms’ capital structure based on key predictions from 
the theory of finance, augmented by variables aimed at capturing the impact of Zimbabwe’s 
reform programme.  The analysis shows that an orthodox model has little explanatory power over 
firms’ capital structure in the pre-reform period, but in the post-reform period it does better.  The 
differences between the pre-reform and post-reform era suggest that the reforms achieved partial 
success in opening up the capital markets and improving the transparency of firm financing 
behaviour. 
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 1. Introduction 
It is widely agreed that the emergence of a dynamic business sector is an important ingredient in 
the process of economic development in poorer countries.  In this respect, a crucial issue is to 
understand how firms in developing countries finance their activities and how changes in 
economic policy impact on these financing decisions.  However, as Prasad, Green and Murinde 
(2001) point out, very little is known about company financing decisions in developing 
countries.  Even the basic facts are by no means agreed.  The seminal studies of Singh and 
Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) utilized company accounts data covering the largest companies 
in selected developing countries within the International Finance Corporation (IFC) database.  
They found that, in comparison with firms in OECD countries, firms in developing countries 
generally utilize a greater proportion of external funding than internal funding and a greater 
proportion of equity finance than debt finance.  Given that capital markets in developing 
countries are invariably less well developed than in the industrial countries, especially for 
equities, these findings were surprising.  However, Cobham and Subramaniam (1998) argued 
that the findings were in part an artefact of Singh and Hamid’s methodology and sampling, 
which they claimed biased the statistics in favour of external funding.  Concentrating on a single 
country (India), but using larger samples of companies and a different methodology based on 
work by Mayer (1988) and by Corbett and Jenkinson (1997), they argued that external and 
equity funding ratios in India were substantially lower than claimed by Singh and Hamid.  A 
further study of the accounts of large companies in 10 developing countries using the IFC 
database by Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001; hereafter: BADM) 
utilized a methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), and found that debt ratios varied 
substantially across developing countries, but overall were not out of line with comparable data 
for OECD countries. 
A partial reconciliation of the different methodologies employed by previous researchers was 
discussed by Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2001; hereafter: GMS) who also analysed a 
large sample of Indian company accounts.  Their results broadly confirmed Singh and Hamid’s 
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 findings on external funding ratios but not on debt ratios which, like BADM, they found to be 
more in line with OECD data.  Crucially however, they found that time- and company-averages 
could conceal considerable changes in company behaviour.  In India, there were measurable, 
significant changes over time in external funding and debt ratios.  Many of these could have 
been related to the economic reform programmes undertaken in India during the late-1980s and 
early 1990s, but GMS did not test this hypothesis explicitly.  It is clearly reasonable to expect 
that company financing patterns in developing countries will evolve over time as capital markets 
develop, and in response to any economic reform programmes which may be undertaken.  
Therefore an essential next step in understanding company financing in developing economies is 
to examine how far the data are influenced by economic policy changes in different countries. 
In this paper we take up the theme of company financing and economic reform, and empirically 
examine the impact of economic reform programmes on the financing choices of the corporate 
sector in Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe is of interest for several reasons.  First and most basic, 
Zimbabwe is one of relatively few sub-Saharan African countries with an established corporate 
sector and a company accounts database which is long-established and of good quality, as we 
discuss below.  Zimbabwe was included in the sample of countries originally considered by 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and by BADM (2001), and further results for Zimbabwe therefore 
offer an interesting perspective on previous research.  Second, the Zimbabwean corporate sector 
has evolved through three major and dramatically-different economic regimes: the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) period (1965-1979), the first decade of independence (1980-
1990) and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) period that started in 
December 1991. During the UDI period, international sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe, 
forcing the government to adopt an import substitution industrialisation policy.  At that time, the 
only source of external finance for the corporate sector was the domestic financial system.  
During the first decade of independence the economy was heavily controlled and by the late 
1980s there were serious problems of high unemployment levels, inflation rates and a growing 
budget deficit.  As an attempt to address these economic problems, the government adopted an 
economic reform programme in 1991 with the aim of raising savings, investment and economic 
W:\Dept Research papers\Papers2002\5-02\erp02-5.doc 2
 growth1.  Thus Zimbabwe has evolved through three very different economic policy regimes 
and it offers a particularly interesting setting within which to examine questions about economic 
policy, financial sector growth and company financial behaviour.   
In this study we concentrate on evaluating the impact of the economic reform programme begun 
in 1991.  We set up an eclectic but orthodox model of capital structure to test hypotheses about 
the financing decisions of listed firms in Zimbabwe.  We then enlarge this model to include 
factors which model the possible effects of the economic reform programme.  Among these 
factors we distinguish between the direct channels of policy such as tax rate changes and 
indirect channels such as improvements in the capital market which flow from broad measures 
of financial sector reform.  Our main hypothesis is that economic reform has helped make 
financial decisions more transparent and has improved the financing opportunities of the 
corporate sector in Zimbabwe. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic facts about corporate 
financing in Zimbabwe over the period 1990-99.  Section 3 summarizes the main theories of 
capital structure and sets out the model to be tested.  Section 4 contains the results of estimating 
this model and evaluates the impact of economic reform.  Summary and conclusions are 
presented in section 5. 
2. The Pattern of Corporate Financing in Zimbabwe 
In this section, we summarise the patterns of corporate financing in Zimbabwe using company 
accounts data.  The main objective of the analysis is to investigate the role of the domestic 
financial markets, particularly banks and the stock market in financing the Zimbabwean 
corporate sector in the period 1990-99, just prior to and then following economic reform.  The 
data consist of the annual accounts of 52 non-financial companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange from its inception in 1946 through 1999, but excluding companies that were either 
delisted or taken over.  The data were obtained from the annual reports of the individual 
companies and from various issues of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Handbook2. 
W:\Dept Research papers\Papers2002\5-02\erp02-5.doc 3
 __________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 shows the gross sources of finance for the 52 sample companies for the period under 
review.  These data were calculated by summing the cash amounts from each source over all 
companies and then expressing the totals as percentages of gross investment.  For 1990-99 as a 
whole (the rightmost column), the cash amounts were summed over time and then expressed as 
percentages of the total for 1990-99.  This methodology for measuring corporate financial 
structures is most nearly akin to that proposed by Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) and used by 
Cobham and Subramaniam (1998) in their study of India. 
Since the basic financing choice faced by firms is between internal and external sources, we 
subdivided the sources accordingly.  Internal sources were further subdivided into depreciation 
and retained profits.  External sources were subdivided into long-term and short-term.  Long-
term finance comprises equity, bonds, bank loans, foreign loans, finance lease, hire purchase, 
and others.  Equity finance is mainly composed of new and rights issues.  Bonds consist of 
preference shares and debentures.  Bank loans represent medium and long-term loans provided 
by the domestic banking sector, mainly commercial banks and the Zimbabwe Development 
Bank.  Foreign loans encompass offshore financing and other foreign loans from institutions 
such as the International Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank.  ‘Other’ 
long-term sources consist of loans from domestic non-bank financial institutions, such as 
pension funds and building societies.  Short-term finance comprises bank overdrafts, bank 
acceptances, trade credit and other short-term sources.  ‘Other’ short-term sources consist of the 
portion of long-term debt falling due in a year’s time and other short-term borrowings not 
included in the other categories. 
For 1990-99 as a whole, external finance contributed 75% of total funds and internal finance 
provided the remaining 25%.  Short-term finance accounted for 52% of external funds with 
long-term finance contributing the remaining 23%. There were some interesting differences 
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 among the different components of long-term finance.  Equity financing was the most important 
source of long-term finance at 8%.  ‘Other’ sources of long-term finance (7%) were the second 
most important source, and foreign loans contributed 5% of external funds.  Long-term bank 
loans and bonds were each a very minor component of total external financing.  The most 
important source of short-term financing was from trade credit, which provided about 29% of 
the total, with most of the remaining 23% being provided by banks.  Table 1 shows that there 
were surges in equity financing in 1991 and 1997 when equities contributed as much as 18% 
and 21% (respectively) of total financing.  The high contribution of the stock market in these 
years may be related to policy changes involving the raising of barriers to foreign investors.  
These changes took  place in 1991 at the start of the overall economic reform program, and at 
the end of 1996 when entry barriers to foreign investors were lowered further.  Clearly though, 
the data suggest that the increased use of the equity market which followed these reforms was 
very short-lived, a phenomenon that was also documented for India in the 1980s by Cobham and 
Subramaniam (1998).  However, GMS argued that increased use of the equity market in India in 
the 1990s was more long-lived. 
It is interesting to compare the results from our study with other comparable studies.  Singh and 
Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) examined the financing patterns in Zimbabwe for the period 
1980-893.  Exceptionally among the countries they study, their data suggest that internal finance 
was more important than external finance in Zimbabwe.  Our results suggest that Zimbabwean 
companies relied more heavily on external finance and are therefore more consistent with the 
other countries studied by Singh and Hamid.  The difference between our findings and those of 
Singh and Hamid are more likely to be due to the different time periods studied than to the 
different methodologies used, as the Singh method tends to produce a higher share of external 
financing than ours.  Singh and Hamid’s data covers the early independence period following 
the end of UDI when Zimbabwean companies were largely forced to rely on their own 
resources, whereas our data covers a later period when the economy was more open.  This 
would be consistent with the higher share of external financing that we find.  Singh (1995) also 
reported a much higher share of equity finance in Zimbabwe (43.5%) than we do (8%).  This 
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 difference probably is due more to methodological differences, as Singh’s method does tend to 
produce a higher share of equity financing than ours.  See inter alia Cobham and Subramaniam 
(1998) on these methodological points. 
3. A Model of Capital Structure Decisions 
The theory of capital structure has been comprehensively reviewed in several recent papers.  
Examples include Harris and Raviv (1991) who concentrate primarily on theoretical issues and 
Prasad, Green, and Murinde (2001), who focus on applications in developing countries.  For this 
reason we do not attempt a comprehensive literature survey in this section.  Instead, table 2 
summarizes the main variables suggested by theory which are usually thought to influence a 
company’s capital structure.  These variables are derived from four of the main strands of 
literature which can be summarised as follows.  First are theories based on asymmetric 
information as between different stakeholders in the firm, a seminal contribution in this strand 
being Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory; second are agency theories, notably Jensen and 
Meckling (1976); third are transactions costs theories of the firm, advocated particularly by 
Williamson (1988); and fourth are extensions of Modigliani and Miller (1963) which argue that 
differential taxation of corporations and their stakeholders set up incentives for firms to finance 
their activities in particular ways. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 3 summarizes the main empirical studies with a bearing on the application of these 
variables in modelling capital structure.  The list of references is intended to be illustrative and 
certainly not comprehensive.  Table 3 includes the same firm-specific variables as table 2.  
However, it should be emphasized that the corporate tax rate is both a firm-specific variable, 
depending as it does on each firm’s financial position in relation to deductibles such as 
depreciation, and a policy channel as it also depends on the corporate tax rules in place at any 
given time.  Table 3 includes a further set of 3 macro-economic variables: measures of inflation, 
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 bank liquidity, and stock market development.  These variables are policy- and development- 
related variables which model the impact of financial development and financial reform on firm 
behaviour.  See BADM (2001) for details.  These variables are an important component of our 
effort to model and understand the impact of the policy reform process in Zimbabwe. 
Even the brief summary contained in table 3 underlines the conclusion of Prasad, Green and 
Murinde (2001) that the empirical literature on corporate capital structure is relatively 
fragmented.  Notwithstanding some of the main theoretical predictions, it is not difficult to 
obtain a variety of empirical results, some of which are consistent with one or another 
underlying theory and others which are not consistent with any current theory.  In this paper we 
do not seek to make a new contribution to capital structure theory.  Rather we aim to use an 
eclectic model as a vehicle for arriving at a preliminary evaluation of the impact of economic 
policy reforms on capital structure decisions.  The general empirical model which we estimate 
can be written using standard notation as: 
    Y  jt
i
ijtijt X εβ +=∑
Here, Yjt is the capital structure measure which we seek to explain, Xijt are i = 1,…, I explanatory 
variables, and j = 1,…,J indexes the firms in the sample.  The empirical counterparts to these 
variables are described next. 
Yjt = The debt ratio, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets.  This variable can be defined 
in many different ways.  See inter alia Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Green, Murinde and 
Suppakitjarak (2001).  It transpires that the general character of our results are not affected by 
the  definition which is chosen.  Therefore, to avoid excessive repetition, we only present results 
for total debt/total assets, as this is the statistic which is most straightforward to compute on a 
broadly comparable basis across countries.  See Mutenheri (2001) for further details. 
The explanatory variables and the expected signs of their coefficients are given as follows: 
Profitability (-/+) =  ratio of operating income to total assets. 
Size (+)  =  log of total assets.  
Cash flow (+) =  income attributable to shareholders as a proportion of turnover. 
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 Dividends (-) =  dividend payable as a proportion of operating income.  This is included as a 
supplementary indicator of firm liquidity.  Following Shenoy and Koch (1996) we assume that 
dividends are predetermined in relation to the capital structure decision. 
Growth opportunities (-) =  percentage change in total assets.  
Asset tangibility (+) =  ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Risk (-) = ratio of unexpected income to total assets.  Unexpected income is estimated as the 
absolute values of the residuals from firm-specific regressions of net income before interest and 
tax on a constant and a time trend.  
Corporate tax rate (+) =  the ratio of tax paid to operating income.  
Inflation (+) =  percentage change in consumer price index, an (inverse) measure of real 
financing costs.  
Bank liquidity (+) =  the ratio of M2 to GDP, a proxy for bank development.  
Stock market development (+) = the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP, a proxy for 
stock market development. 
Data for the estimation of the model was collected from the financial statements of 18 
companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange from 1985 to 1999.  The dataset was then 
divided into two sub-samples.  The first subsample covers 1986-1990, the period of financial 
repression and this is referred to as equation 1 in the following discussion.  Equation 2 covers 
1995-1999, corresponding to the post-reform period.  Given that reform began in 1991, it was 
decided to omit the years 1991-94 on the grounds that the impact of reform would be felt only 
gradually.  By 1995, the reforms were mostly in place and firms would have had time to adjust 
to them and complete a transition to a new equilibrium.  We took the view that the sample was 
too small and the possible adjustments too complex for it to be useful for us to attempt the 
estimation of a dynamic model to study the transition process itself.  However, for completeness 
we did also estimate a third equation using data from the entire sample period 1986-1999.  The 
model was estimated using both the fixed effects and random effects methods.  F tests were used 
to test for the validity of the fixed effects against the null of pooled OLS, and Hausman tests 
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 were used to compare the fixed effects and random effects methods.  See for example Baltagi 
(1995) for details. 
4. Empirical Results 
The results from the three regression equations and the relevant diagnostics are presented in 
table 4.  Individual effects are important in all 3 equations.  However, the Hausman tests 
suggest that the random effects method is an adequate parameterisation of equations 1 and 3, 
whereas the fixed effects method is required for equation 2. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 4 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
It is evident that there are substantial differences between the estimated equations for the pre-
reform and post-reform periods.  In the pre-reform period, 5 out of 11 variables have the 
theoretically expected sign, and only one variable (asset tangibility) is significant.  Moreover, 
the sign of the coefficient on tangibility (-) would suggest that firms with more fixed assets tend 
to borrow less, which is not consistent with the predictions of theory, as suggested by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) or Williamson (1988).  A possible explanation for this relationship is that 
the variable may be a proxy for the non-debt tax shields of Zimbabwean firms rather than a 
measure of asset specificity.  In Zimbabwe, a wide range of fixed assets qualify for a Special 
Initial Allowance which allows 100% first year depreciation of fixed assets for corporate tax 
purposes.  Companies that acquired fixed assets enjoy a substantial tax shelter, which in turn 
would reduce the taxable income that could be shielded by debt.  Thus, purchases of fixed assets 
may tend to dominate the tangibility ratio and also the tax shields enjoyed by Zimbabwean 
firms.  Comparing our results for equation 1 with those of BADM, who estimated equations for 
the total debt ratio for Zimbabwe covering 1980-90, we find a rather broad similarity in that they 
too find few significant coefficients4 and many counter-intuitive signs, such as a negative 
coefficient on firm size.  However, their analysis ends in 1990 before the reform programme got 
under way. 
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 The results from equation 2 show that 6 variables have the theoretically expected sign and 5 
variables have significant coefficients.  Asset tangibility is now positively related to the debt 
ratio and significant at the 10% level suggesting that during the post-reform period firms with 
collateral assets might have better access to the debt market.  The change of sign of the 
tangibility ratio would suggest that during the first decade of independence, access to the debt 
market was determined by factors not captured by the included variables, whereas after the 
implementation of the reform program, access to the debt market required collateral assets.  The 
demand for collateral by banks in the post-reform era was such that it led to the establishment of 
the Venture Capital Company of Zimbabwe and the Indigenous Business Development Centre 
in order to cater for the financing needs of small- and medium-scale enterprises.  This clearly 
suggests how the reform programme did alter firm behaviour.  The other variable which is 
significant at the 10% level, is the growth rate which is positively related to firm debt ratios,  
suggesting that firms with high growth rates use more debt than those with low growth rates.  
This is contrary to orthodox theory but may be reasonable in the Zimbabwean context.  
Outsiders in a thin equity market may have more difficulty in recognising a firm’s growth 
opportunities than would more specialized outsiders in banks, leading to a preference of growth-
oriented firms for more debt. 
The tax rate, firm risk and bank liquidity are all significant at the 1% level, although the first 
two of these coefficients have counter-theoretical signs.  The negative relation between the tax 
rate and the debt ratio is still consistent with the findings of Krishnan & Moyer (1996) among 
others.  In Zimbabwe, the relationship could be attributeable to an expectational effect induced 
by government tax policy.  The corporate tax rate was reduced every year from 1980 to 1999.  
Companies would therefore have had an incentive to bring forward tax shelters as much as 
possible to maximise their tax benefits prior to the next cut.  Thus, successive tax cuts would be 
associated with increases in debt ratios as firms expected further tax cuts in the future.  The 
positive coefficient on firm risk could be explained by the fact that firms with risky earnings 
seek external funds (working capital) to smooth their financing.  This is especially plausible in 
Zimbabwe where we noted in section 3 that on average short-term loans constituted about 52% 
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 of firms’ external finance.  This is consistent with Myers’ (1977) argument that short-term debt 
may be positively related to risk.  This result implies that banks play an important role in 
providing short-term loans to listed firms.  The positive coefficient on bank liquidity suggests 
that the development of banks encourages corporate borrowing.  It is particularly striking that 
this coefficient changes sign between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
In the third equation, 7 coefficients have the correct sign and 3 are significant.  However, given 
the differences between equations 1 and 2 we do not attach much importance to the pooled 
estimates as a stable ‘model’ of the whole period. 
Overall, the results from the three equations suggest that the conventional theory of capital 
structure has relatively little explanatory power in the pre-reform period in the sense that only 
one variable is significant in the debt equation in the pre-reform period whereas five variables 
are significant in the post-reform era.  Economic regulations by the government in the first 
decade of independence constrained company financing behaviour.  It could mean that during 
this period, firms were operating at sub-optimal debt ratios implying an inefficient allocation of 
resources.  The structural adjustment programme appears to have changed this behaviour to 
some extent.  Firm size, asset tangibility, tax rates, cash flow, earnings volatility and bank 
liquidity became important determinants of corporate capital structures in the post-reform era.  
However, the results from the second equation seem to suggest that firms with high growth rates 
and fluctuating earnings borrowed more than those with low growth rates and stable earnings, 
suggesting that the orthodox theories of capital structure may need modification in the context 
of developing countries like Zimbabwe.  Moreover, the results from equation 2 show that 
profitability, dividends, cash flow, stock market development, and inflation are not significant 
determinants of corporate financing decisions.  This suggests that although the structural 
adjustment program may have addressed some of the economic problems in Zimbabwe, more 
still needs to be done and this might explain why company behaviour does not respond to some 
of the factors suggested in the literature to be of importance for capital structure decisions. 
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 5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we first empirically examined the financing pattern of the Zimbabwean corporate 
sector, using company accounts data.  Our major conclusion from this examination is that listed 
firms rely heavily on external finance, especially short term bank financing.  Long-term bank 
loans make little contribution to financing of the corporate sector.  The stock market, on the 
other hand, does seem to contribute significantly to the financing of the corporate sector.  
Second, we econometrically investigated key determinants of firms’ financial behaviour 
suggested by the theory of finance, but augmented by variables aimed at capturing the impact of 
economic reforms and financial development in Zimbabwe.  Our main conclusion from this 
analysis is that these factors have limited power to explain the capital structure of listed firms 
during the pre-reform period.  However in the post-reform period, asset tangibility, tax rates, 
growth opportunities, earnings volatility and bank liquidity are all significant determinants of 
capital structure.  The differences between the pre-reform and post-reform era suggest that the 
reforms did achieve a partial success in opening up the capital markets and improving the 
transparency of firm financing behaviour.  
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 Footnotes 
1. Details of the reform programme are given in Mutenheri (2001). 
2. Data on equity issues were kindly provided by Oliver Lutz of Sagit stockbrokers 
3. BADM (2001) used balance sheet data in their study of Zimbabwe and other developing 
countries, and their statistics are therefore not strictly comparable with ours.  In particular, 
it is difficult to derive information on internal and external financing from balance sheet 
data.  Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2001) discuss this point. 
4. BADM’s results are hard to interpret because they report fixed and random effects 
estimates but do not provide any basic diagnostics such as Hausman tests. 
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 Table 1. Zimbabwe: Listed Companies’ Gross Sources of Finance, 1990-99 
(52 companies; in per-cent of total financing) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990-99
            
Internal Finance 16.3 17.8 17.7 19.7 28.7 22.9 19.9 17.9 25.3 32.8 24.6 
Retained Income 9.4 12.0 10.9 12.9 22.0 14.1 12.0 10.9 18.5 25.8 17.5 
Depreciation 6.9 5.8 6.8 6.7 6.7 8.8 7.9 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.1 
            
External Finance 83.7 82.2 82.3 80.3 71.3 77.1 80.1 82.1 74.7 67.2 75.4 
            
Long-term Finance 29.8 37.4 32.0 26.4 24.9 29.3 30.8 34.6 15.4 14.9 23.6 
Equity Finance 8.8 17.6 6.4 7.9 7.0 7.6 9.5 20.5 2.7 2.8 7.8 
Bonds 0.9 2.7 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.6 0.7 1.8 1.1 0.7 1.0 
Bank Loans 2.6 2.0 1.3 2.1 0.9 0.3 1.7 1.8 1.1 0.5 1.2 
Foreign Loans 3.0 2.7 2.1 3.2 11.9 10.3 8.9 4.7 2.0 3.8 5.0 
Finance Lease 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 1.0 0.4 2.4 0.4 0.9 
Hire Purchase 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 2.0 0.3 0.6 
Other sources 14.4 12.4 21.2 12.9 4.8 8.2 7.9 5.3 4.1 6.3 7.2 
            
Short-term Finance 53.9 44.8 50.3 54.0 46.4 47.8 49.3 47.6 59.3 52.3 51.8 
Bank Overdraft 8.5 8.6 14.7 8.8 8.8 8.7 6.2 7.4 11.5 9.5 9.3 
Bank Acceptance 2.6 1.3 1.7 2.6 2.2 1.2 3.2 2.7 4.1 1.3 2.4 
Trade Credit 27.3 18.5 24.1 27.1 22.7 23.7 25.7 23.9 35.5 29.3 27.8 
Other S/Term Sources 15.4 16.4 9.8 15.5 12.7 14.3 14.2 13.6 8.2 12.2 12.2 
 
 
 
Table 2. Theoretical Determinants of Debt Ratios. 
 
Firm Factor Impact on 
Leverage 
Reason Model Reference 
Positive Pecking order hypothesis Asymmetric information  Myers (1984) Profitability 
Negative Enhances firm’s ability to borrow   
Size Positive Less vulnerable to bankruptcy Asymmetric information Myers (1984) 
Free Cash Flow Positive Pre-commitment  Agency  Jensen(1986) 
Growth opportunities Negative Under-investment problem Agency Myers (1977) 
Positive Collaterals Agency Jensen and Meckling (1976) Asset Tangibility 
Positive Reduces bankruptcy costs Transaction costs Williamson (1988) 
Risk Negative Bankruptcy costs Transaction costs Myers (1977) 
Corporate tax rate Positive Reduces corporate tax burden Taxation  Modgliani & Miller (1963) 
Non-debt tax shields Negative Shields firm tax Taxation  DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) 
Asset diversification Positive Reduces risk   
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 Table 3. Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
Factor Expected
Sign 
Theoretical Reference Empirical 
Positive 
Evidence 
Negative 
Profitability Positive 
Negative 
Rajan &Zingales (1995) 
Myers(1984) 
 Titman & Wissels(1988) 
Jensen & Meckling (1992) 
Size Positive Kim & Sorensen (1986) Firth (1995) 
Hussain (1997) 
Titman & Wissels(1988) 
Free cash flow Positive Jensen (1986) Shenoy and Koch (1996) Lowe, Naughton, & Taylor 
(1994) 
Growth opportunities Negative Myers(1977) 
Jensen (1986) 
Krishnan & Moyer (1996) Homaifar, Zietz & Benkato 
(1994) 
Asset tangibility Positive Myers (1977) Jensen & Meckling (1992) 
Thies & Klock (1992) 
 
Risk Negative Bradley, Jarrell & Kim(1984)  Mackie-Mason (1990) 
Saa-Requejo(1996) 
Corporate tax rate Positive Modgliani and Miller (1963) Homaifar, Zietz & Benkato 
(1994) 
Krishnan & Moyer (1996) 
Non-debt tax shields Negative DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) Boyle & Eckhold (1997) Wiwattanakantang (1999) 
Inflation Positive BADM (2001)  BADM (2001) 
Bank liquidity Positive Dermirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic(1996) BADM (2001)  
Stock market 
development 
Negative Dermirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic(1996)  BADM (2001) 
 
BADM: Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2001) 
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Table 4. Regression Results 
 
  Pre-reform 
(1986-90) 
Post-reform 
(1995-99) 
Pooled 
(1986-99) 
Explanatory variable Expected sign Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Profitability  -/+ 0.038 0.238 -0.046 
  (0.290) (1.433) (0.755) 
Size  + 2.911 5.450 3.595 
  (0.463) (0.803) (2.493)** 
Cash flow + -0.028 -0.300 -0.027 
  (0.423) (1.177) (0.585) 
Dividends - 0.074 -0.045 -0.015 
  (1.337) (0.451) (0.423) 
Growth opportunities - 0.010 0.065 -0.005 
  (0.256) (1.888)* (0.263) 
Asset tangibility + -0.202 0.234 0.032 
  (2.305)** (1.884)* (0.682) 
Firm risk - -0.012 0.242 0.066 
  (0.207) (2.578)*** (2.146)** 
Corporate tax rate + -0.034 -0.294 -0.027 
  (0.639) (3.322)*** (0.854) 
Inflation  + 0.247 -0.100 -0.029 
  (0.622) (1.047) (0.530) 
Bank liquidity + -1.953 0.964 0.488 
  (0.552) (2.795)*** (2.378)** 
Stock market - -0.217 -0.004 -0.010 
  (1.079) (0.059) (0.220) 
Specification Tests     
Test for company effects  F(17,61) = 15.7 F(17,61) = 5.0 F(17,151) = 5.5 
Hausman test  χ2(11) = 8.9 χ2(11) = 20.9 χ2(11) = 16.1 
 Notes 
 T statistics are in parentheses.  Significance shown by:  *  10 %, level;  **  5 % level;  ***  1 % level 
 Critical values at 5% level for:  F(17,61) = 1.84;   F(17,151) = 1.67;   χ2(11) = 19.7 
 
                                                 
